Objective
This section summarizes some fundamental concepts of school threat assessment and typical pathways to violence.
Basic Principles of School Threat Assessment
Over the past twenty years, several key publications on school-based threat assessment practices have offered general principles and outlined specific procedures for application. The following fundamental concepts, drawn from work by the National Threat Assessment Center (2018, 2019, 2021), input from our experts, and other resources, should guide a school-based threat assessment process:10,11,52
Recognize that school shootings are not random or spontaneous.
Almost all school shootings studied by the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) were acts of targeted violence, meaning that the attacker planned and intended to harm a particular target, group, or organization. Studies of school shootings found that most attackers developed plans and prepared to carry out their attacks over a period of days, weeks, or months. Students do not “snap”; their attack is preceded by a period of planning during which they often share their thoughts and intentions with others. As a result, it is possible to identify and intervene to prevent this kind of violence. It is also important to recognize that threat assessment can be a useful way to prevent less severe forms of violence, such as bullying and fighting, that are preceded by threatening statements or behavior. Students who receive a threat assessment should not be seen as at risk for a school shooting.
Consider the context.
A threat assessment team must always consider the context in which the threat occurs. A threatening statement can have different meanings depending on the context. The team should account for the situation, setting, and target of the threat. The context of a threat will greatly influence whether the threat is serious or not serious and what actions should be taken.
Maintain an investigative mindset.
Teams must approach threat assessment with a critical mindset, avoiding quick conclusions or assumptions and seeking to gather information to corroborate and confirm hypotheses. Team members should be willing to question one another and discuss what they know to reach the most reasonable and defensible conclusions.
Focus on facts and behaviors, not traits or profiles.
There is no reliable profile of a violent student or traits that are specific to someone who commits a violent act. Teams must be careful not to speculate or draw inferences about a “kind of person” who commits a violent attack. Instead, an assessment should be focused on objective facts and behaviors that indicate an individual is planning or preparing to carry out a threat.
Use information from all possible sources.
Teams must not rely on a single source of information. They must take a systematic approach to information gathering. The student has relationships with people both within and outside the school system who may have information to share. Teams should consider gathering information from multiple sources, such as parents, classmates, teachers, counselors, mental health providers, coaches, and others. There may be valuable information available from other organizations, such as social service or law enforcement agencies.
Making a threat is not the same as posing a threat.
Any student can make a threat, but relatively few will engage in the planning and preparation necessary to carry it out. Threat assessment must go beyond the simple facts of what a student said or did to understand whether the student poses a threat, which means that the student has the intent, capability, and means to carry out the threat. Keep in mind that it is important to consider observable facts and behaviors rather than the perceived traits of a student when considering the seriousness of a threatening statement.
For more information, see:
- The FBI’s initial report on school shootings recommended a threat assessment approach rather than a profiling approach and a subsequent report provided guidance on preventing targeted attacks in general.8,43
- Reports by the U.S. Secret Service (two with the U.S. Department of Education) described findings from the studies of school shootings and recommended the use of threat assessment.8-11,52
Challenge: Context Matters
A student says, “I’m gonna kill you!”
Consider how context changes the significance of this threatening statement:
- The student is playing chess with a friend and expects to win.
- A football player is lined up to rush the quarterback.
- A six-year old boy with Down’s Syndrome is upset with his teacher.
- A 4th grader is about to fight a classmate.
- A middle school girl is angry with a friend for revealing a secret.
- A high school student is brandishing a knife at a teacher.
- A student is reported to have borrowed a handgun from a classmate.
Pathways to Violence
There is no single profile, checklist, or set of characteristics that indicates whether a student will carry out a violent act.8 School authorities should be leery of claims that violence can be predicted with a formula or rating system.53 Instead, school teams should be aware that there are many different behavioral pathways to violence. Research on juvenile homicide identified three common patterns of youth violence that are useful in recognizing the variety of backgrounds, motives, and risk factors leading to violence.54-57 It is important to note that not all youth can be distinctly classified into one of these pathways. Youth on any given pathway may not demonstrate every common characteristic listed on that pathway. In short, this is a guide for teams to recognize different patterns of risk factors leading to violence and to help guide appropriate interventions to address the underlying contributing factors to targeted violence.
Studies of juvenile homicide occurring in any setting labeled the three groups as (1) antisocial, (2) conflict, and (3) psychotic.58 Studies of juveniles who committed homicides at school used a similar categorization: (1) psychopathic, (2) traumatized, and (3) psychotic.59 A more elaborate classification using six groups has some further distinctions.54 Regardless of the number of categories, the relevance of threat assessment is to recognize that there are multiple pathways leading to violence and that no single profile is feasible. Instead, school teams should examine each case holistically to identify whether a youth is moving down a behavioral pathway toward violence and to respond with interventions and supports to prevent violence. These groups do not directly map onto special education categories, and there should be no implication that students identified with a disability would necessarily be more dangerous or threatening than other students.
The antisocial or psychopathic group consists of youth who have a childhood history of behavior problems, dishonesty, and defiance of authority. Their behavior includes many of the symptoms associated with the diagnoses of conduct disorder used for youth and antisocial personality disorder used for persons after the age 18. Typically, these youth show little empathy or concern for others, and lack remorse for the harm they cause others. They have narcissistic feelings of superiority and grandiosity and a desire to bully or dominate others that can include cruel or sadistic behavior. They most often engage in violent crime for predatory, goal-directed purposes such as acquiring money, drugs, or power. In many cases, they act in concert with other youth as part of a gang.
Most of the youth in this group commit multiple delinquent acts that escalate into serious violent crimes such as robbery and forcible rape. In the case of school shootings, a subgroup of these youth carry out an attack in a grandiose pursuit of infamy and to exert sadistic power over others without regard for the consequences of their actions. The antisocial/psychopathic group is the largest group of violent juvenile offenders and will come to the attention of school authorities most often for fighting and bullying others, but they are less prominent among the narrow group who committed mass attacks at their school.54-57 Threat assessment teams working with students in this group should make use of evidence-based programs and practices for supporting and intervening with behaviors associated with conduct disorder.60
Resource: Finding Evidence Based Practices and Programs
There are a few clearinghouses that rate evidence-based interventions and programs. To review these clearinghouses, visit
Challenge
Some of the behaviors listed may also describe some students with certain kinds of disabilities. Students in some disability categories may show characteristics such as impulsivity and low frustration tolerance that could lead to them making threatening statements. A threat assessment process can be a useful tool to help staff avoid overreacting to these behaviors by carefully examining the reason for the behavior and the role of the student’s disability in it.
The conflict or traumatized group consists of youth who commit a violent act because of a conflict or dispute that was highly stressful and emotionally overwhelming. These youth typically do not have a history of serious misbehavior in school and lack the features of conduct disorder observed in the antisocial group. They may be attention-seeking and eager for peer acceptance that is denied to them by their tormentors. They might have a history of parental mistreatment or abuse and/or peer conflicts involving harassment or bullying. Their violent attacks are motivated by revenge and retaliation (as well as other factors).
These cases are prominent in school shootings in which the student attacker was a victim of severe and persistent bullying. Other cases involve youth charged with parental homicide in the home. However, it should be stressed that most youth who are victims of bullying or abusive treatment at home do not commit acts of homicide. Such cases involve dire circumstances in which other factors are often present, especially the youth’s perception that their feelings of distress and humiliation are unbearable and that there are no other options available. Research on childhood trauma can be a helpful resource on this topic, although it must be emphasized that individuals with trauma histories alone should not be regarded as potentially violent.61,62 Threat assessment teams seeing students in this group should make use of evidence-based programs for symptoms and behaviors associated with trauma, victimization, and depression.63
The third group, psychotic, is the smallest but fuels the misconception that persons with mental illness are especially violent. In the small number of cases in which a person with mental illness commits a violent attack, the person’s violent act might be motivated by delusional thinking, such as a paranoid belief that someone is out to get them or a grandiose belief they are on some kind of noble mission. They may experience auditory hallucinations in the form of voices that urge them to commit a violent attack. These cases are usually diagnosed with a severe mental disorder such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder with psychotic features (i.e., delusions and/or hallucinations). However, in many cases, the full extent of the person’s mental illness was not evident to persons around them because signs and symptoms of psychosis (such as talking back to auditory hallucinations) were overlooked or minimized. Threat assessment teams working with these youth will make referrals for psychotherapeutic and psychiatric treatment.
Trauma-Informed Resources
The National Center for School Safety has a number of resources on trauma-informed care. Visit these links to learn more about a trauma-informed approach:
- Trauma-Informed, Resilience-Oriented Schools Toolkit
- Trauma-Informed, Resilience-Oriented Classroom Self-Paced Training
- Trauma-Informed, Resilience-Oriented Leadership and Crisis Navigation Self-Paced Training
- Trauma-Informed Practices: Prevention and De-Escalating Disruptive Behavior On-Demand Webinar
- Trauma-Informed Practices Across School Settings On-Demand Webinar
Key Term
Serious misbehavior: Although schools may have slight variations in how behavior is classified, serious misbehavior typically includes behaviors such as fighting, carrying weapons, and selling drugs in school.
Challenge: Disrespectful and Defiant Behavior
A common concern in school discipline is determining when disrespectful and defiant behavior is more serious and should result in a referral to the school office, or, in some cases to the threat assessment team. The student’s behavior must always be examined in the student’s environmental and developmental context.
Steps Toward Violence
The classifications in the section above are most helpful in alerting teams to the variety of backgrounds observed in youth who commit violent acts and to avoid adherence to stereotypes. There is room for considerable variation around the antisocial, conflict, and psychotic themes. Yet, in the days or weeks preceding an attack, the three pathways can show convergence around typical behaviors that demonstrate planning and preparation for violence. There are at least five steps toward violence that can be distinguished, although they are not strictly sequential or mutually exclusive. All five steps need not be present, but are generally considered to be indicators of increased risk for violence.
Research on Pathway Models
For more detailed analysis of pathway models and related practical advice on threat investigation, see work by Calhoun and Weston (2003, 2021).44,64 Other excellent resources are the case studies of school shootings and averted shootings undertaken by the U.S. Secret Service.11,43,52,65 These descriptive studies make it clear that there is no uniform sequence that applies to all cases, but that many youth can be diverted from an identifiable behavioral pathway to violence.
- Grievance
While grievances are not always present, a study released by NTAC in 2019 identified a grievance as one of the most common motives for targeted violence among K-12 perpetrators.11 One of the most notable first steps leading to an attack can be a perceived grievance that triggers intense disappointment accompanied by frustration and anger. The grievance is a serious injury to the self-esteem of the student such as an episode of bullying, break-up of a romantic relationship, a failing grade, or loss of an opportunity with a sports team or other activity. In one school shooting case, a student was removed from a leadership position on the school debate team.66 In all cases, the student’s perception of the event as severe and life-changing is more important than the objective magnitude of the grievance. The student’s mental state may influence them to perceive the event as much more distressing than would others in a similar situation.
- Rumination
When a student is unable to cope with the disappointment of a grievance, they may begin to ruminate or think excessively about it. They consider different ways to respond, and thoughts of violence can arise. In today’s society, students are exposed to many examples on social media in which other persons with a grievance commit acts of violence directed at themselves or others. The student may fantasize about various ways to carry out a violent attack and how it would affect others and restore their sense of pride or self-esteem. At this stage, students may share their feelings and ruminations with others, and in several school shooting cases, their peers encouraged their thoughts of violence. The key development here is the conclusion that violence alone can resolve the grievance.44
- Planning
At some point, the distressed individual may begin to gather information on how to carry out a violent attack. They may use the Internet to study prior shootings, investigate different kinds of weapons, and develop plans for how to carry out an attack at their school. At any of these stages, but especially the planning stage, the student might reach out to peers for advice or assistance, such as how to obtain a weapon. The student also might invite collaboration on an attack.52
- Preparation
The student crosses into the stage of preparation by taking action to obtain a weapon or other materials needed for the attack. The student might practice using the weapon, examine the site for the attack, or write a manifesto explaining the rationale for the attack. There are many ways that an individual planning an attack will exhibit warning behaviors that leak their intentions.67 Persons who know the student might observe “leakage” that could range from veiled threats and ominous statements about an impending event to explicit posts on social media that reveal their intentions. For this reason, it is especially important that schools foster a community of help-seeking and support so that students are willing to report a classmate’s concerning behavior.68 Schools should have multiple means of receiving reports, such as tip lines or anonymous reporting systems, and should educate students on the difference between seeking help and snitching.69,70
- Attack
When the student begins the attack, there is little or no time for prevention. However, threat assessment teams who had been aware of a student’s threats have in some cases been able to intercept a student just prior to an attack. In such cases, the student had announced their intentions on social media, flashed a weapon, warned friends, or in some other way signaled that an attack was imminent.20,71,72 This stage could be further divided into a “breach” when the individual has initiated the attack but still might be stopped, depending on the nature and quality of security measures in place.44 In these circumstances, there is no time for further assessment and the team must move directly to a crisis response such as notifying law enforcement and securing the school.
Key Term
Leakage: an accidental or intentional communication that reveals intent to commit a violent act, such as making remarks that reveal hostility toward someone or plans of violence. Leakage might occur in direct or indirect ways and might not be a purposeful disclosure. Increasingly, leakage is observed in digital communications such as social media posts, texts, blogs, and emails.
Resource
Check out the National Center for School Safety’s Physical Security Measures Overview to learn more about potential physical security measures to use in your school.
Key Terms
Identification: Identification occurs when someone has a concern about a threat of violence and makes a report that is transmitted to the threat assessment team. These reports may be based on behaviors listed in the pathways to violence earlier in this section.
Assessment: The process of gathering information to evaluate the seriousness of a threat.
Intervention: The team’s response to the threat, which can range from quickly resolving a threat that is not serious to safety planning and protective actions for a very serious threat.
Evaluation: The process of collecting data on the threat assessment process and outcomes to ensure fidelity, equity, and protection of student rights.
Research on Pathway Models
In their study of 35 school attacks, the U.S. Secret Service observed that all but two of the students exhibited concerning behaviors at school prior to their attack.11 About three-quarters (26) displayed them online. These concerning behaviors ranged in severity, but some of the most serious included threats to harm someone, violent acts, bringing weapons to school, and suicidal statements. They described these behaviors as “objectively concerning” or “prohibited” behaviors that would merit immediate attention. Other behaviors, described as “lower-level concerning behaviors”, raised concern but would not require an immediate safety response. Some examples are a depressed or angry mood, peer conflicts, and interest in violent topics. The Secret Service stressed that teams should look for a constellation of lower-level behaviors rather than a single behavior.
There are some important caveats about the use of concerning behaviors or warning sign checklists to initiate a threat assessment.8,53 Many students with no plans to commit an attack will display one or more concerning behaviors, and teams must be careful not to profile a student as dangerous. Research has consistently failed to find an individual profile or set of risk factors that can accurately predict someone will commit a violent act.73 When concerning behaviors such as a depressed mood or peer conflict come to the attention of a threat assessment team, any inquiry or intervention should be based on the student’s needs reflected in the behavior itself. In these cases, often a referral to counseling is more appropriate than a full threat assessment unless a broader constellation of behaviors indicates an intent to harm someone.
Three Stages of School Threat Assessment
Knowing the pathways to violence is an important first step for threat assessment teams to recognize concerning behavior. In order for teams to complete a threat assessment following a concern or report, they need to move through three stages: identification, assessment, and intervention. A key fourth piece is evaluation, monitoring, and accountability. Teams should be monitoring throughout the stages to ensure fidelity to the program and equitable outcomes. Section 3 discusses evaluating your threat assessment program.
Identification occurs when someone has a concern about a threat of violence and makes a report that is transmitted to the threat assessment team. Assessment refers to the process of gathering information to evaluate the seriousness of a threat. Intervention involves the team’s response to the threat, which can range from quickly resolving a threat that is not serious to safety planning and protective actions for a very serious threat.
Stage 1: Identification
The first stage of the threat assessment process is identification of a concerning situation. Threats can come in many forms; they can be oral, written, or transmitted electronically. There might be threatening gestures, drawings, or photos. Threats might be communicated directly to an intended target or indirectly to someone else. In short, any behavior or communication that raises concern that a person has an intent to harm someone should be considered a threat.
Challenge: Who Should Determine the Credibility of a Threat?
There may be situations in which there is no apparent threat, but a student seems withdrawn, distressed, or preoccupied in some way that is concerning. These students might be referred to a school counselor for inquiry, but not a threat assessment.
A threat assessment cannot be conducted if threats are not reported. All members of the school community should know how to report a concerning situation or statement. Reporters are not expected to determine whether a threat is credible, but simply to report observations that raise their concern, so that the threat assessment team can investigate. It is essential that schools encourage threat reporting and provide their community with both confidential and anonymous ways to report threats.
Key Terms
Confidential report: A confidential threat report is one in which authorities know the identity of the person reporting the threat, but agree to keep it secret from the public.
Anonymous report: An anonymous report is one in which no one knows the identity of the person reporting the threat.
Confidential reporting is preferred over anonymous reporting because the credibility of the reporter can be considered and because the team can more readily communicate with the reporter to ask questions and gather more information than in the case of an anonymous report. Anonymous reports are usually in the form of a single report with limited information, although it is possible to arrange a system that allows back-and-forth communication with an anonymous source. The advantage of anonymous reporting is that some reporters are reluctant to reveal their identity and more willing to report if no one knows who they are.
Anonymous Threat Reporting Resources
For information about anonymous reporting systems, visit these resources
Challenge: Who should determine the credibility of a threat?
There is some debate about whether teachers should be trained to distinguish between credible threats and other characteristics. Although threat assessment teams should be responsible for the determination of threats as credible, it is helpful for teachers to understand and appreciate that every threat is not considered credible and serious. Individual teachers may take a zero tolerance approach mindset towards threats, which the use of a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team can avert.
Table 2: Reporting Resources by State
| State | Program |
|---|---|
| Colorado | Safe2Tell-Colorado |
| Florida | Fortify Florida |
| Georgia | 1-877-SAY-STOP |
| Idaho | See Tell Now! |
| Illinois | School Violence Tipline |
| Indiana | See Something, Say Something Indiana |
| Kansas | 1-877-626-8203 |
| Kentucky | S.T.O.P Tipline |
| Louisiana | Say it Here |
| Maryland | Safe Schools |
| Michigan | OK2SAY |
| Mississippi | Stay Safe Hotline |
| Missouri | Courage2Report |
| Nebraska | Safe2HelpNE |
| Nevada | SafeVoice |
| North Carolina | Say Something |
| Ohio | SaferOH |
| Oklahoma | Oklahoma School Security Tipline |
| Oregon | Safe Oregon |
| Pennsylvania | Safe2Say Something |
| Tennessee | SafeTN |
| Texas | iWatchTexas |
| Utah | SafeUT |
| Vermont | Safe4VT |
| West Virginia | Safe Schools Helpline |
| Wisconsin | Speak Up, Speak Out |
| Wyoming | Safe2Tell-Wyoming |
| Available for schools to adopt | Say Something- Sandy Hook Promise |
For more information about tip lines, see these recent publications, funded by a grant from the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice:
- Tip Lines for School Safety: A National Portrait of Tip Line Use.
- School Tip Line Toolkit: A Blueprint for Implementation and Sustainability
Educating Students, Parents, and Staff
A student who plans to harm someone may communicate their intentions to a third party, which is a behavior called leakage.74 Leakage might occur in direct or indirect ways and might not be a purposeful disclosure. Increasingly, leakage is observed in digital communications such as social media posts, texts, blogs, and emails. The success of a threat assessment approach rests on the willingness of members of the school community to recognize and report leakage.
Action Step: School Climate
Building a positive school climate is a key step to a successful threat assessment program. Threat assessments can only be done if concerns are reported. Students should be taught to be upstanders – persons who stand up for something – rather than bystanders – persons who stand by passively and let something happen. Schools must transform bystanders into upstanders. This can be accomplished by staff efforts to create a culture of mutual respect and shared responsibility in which students, staff, families, and others feel that reports are wanted and that something positive will be done about them.
Schools can encourage threat reporting by educating their students, parents, and staff about the threat assessment process and the importance of threat reporting. One study of school shootings found that in the majority (81%) of cases, another person was aware of what a student was thinking or planning.9 Reporters should understand that they are not expected to make an assessment of the seriousness of a threat since that is the job of the threat assessment team.
Research has found various reasons why students (and others) are reluctant to report threats.11,43,68,70,75,76 Studies of school shootings found that students failed to report threats because they did not think the person making the threat was serious or did not believe the person would carry out the threatened act of violence.6,44,68 Other reasons include that the student feared retaliation or did not want to be labeled a snitch. This is one reason for the use of anonymous reporting systems.
Research has found that students are more willing to report threats of violence when they trust the adults at school and believe the adults care about them and have their best interests in mind.43,68,77 Explanations of how the threat assessment team responds to threats might be helpful in allaying concerns about reporting a threat. Threat assessment teams should evaluate their school climate and consider ways to encourage threat reporting.
Threat reporting should extend beyond students to include parents and school staff, who also might observe or learn secondhand about a situation that is concerning and merits reporting. Please see Section 1 of this toolkit for resources on online threat assessment education programs for students, parents, and teachers, which encourage threat reporting.
Stage 2: Assessment
Once a threat has been reported, the team begins the assessment phase by gathering information from multiple sources to determine the seriousness of the threat. Threats occur on a continuum of severity. Different models of threat assessment categorize threats differently, but in general, the first decision is to determine whether a threat exists (i.e., Did the person communicate a threat or engage in threatening behavior?). There are multiple situations where a threat might be reported, but upon investigation, it is not a threat. For example, a reported threat might be an unsubstantiated rumor or a false report. Another example is that a student who posts a photo of himself holding a firearm might be proudly displaying a hunting rifle but not threatening to harm anyone. Suppose the threat assessment team has concerns because a situation seems ambiguous. In that case, it is safest to gather further information until the team is more confident that a threat is present.
Schools using threat assessment must distinguish between a threat assessment and a crisis response. If a threat report indicates that a student attack is imminent (e.g., a student threatening violence has brought a gun to school or is on the way to school with a gun), there is no time for a threat assessment. Rather, the school must implement its crisis response plan, which will likely involve contacting law enforcement and engaging in a building security procedure such as a lockdown. Threat assessments are not used in emergency situations; they are intended to prevent an emergency from arising.
Although there is no set time frame for completing a threat assessment, they should be conducted promptly and efficiently after a report, both in order to assure safety and to mitigate disruption to the student and other affected individuals. Students should not be excluded from school for lengthy periods while an assessment is being conducted. If a student with a disability is being assessed, the team should take into consideration the student’s disability and confer with the Individualized Education Plan (IEP) team as appropriate.
If the team determines a threat occurred, then the second decision is whether the threat is legitimate and serious, meaning that the person has serious intent to harm someone. Many threats are not serious expressions of intent to harm someone, such as jokes or figures of speech. Other threats might be expressions of anger or frustration, or efforts to intimidate someone (sometimes called “howling”) without a genuine intent to commit a violent act.64 Threat assessment teams are most concerned with identifying the small percentage of threats that represent leakage by someone who is planning or preparing to carry out a violent attack.
Threat assessment authorities recommend that teams should follow systematic procedures to gather all information to understand the student’s thinking, behavior, and circumstances. There is no uniform order for gathering information. Much will depend on the nature of the threat and the availability of persons who could be interviewed. If the threat is conveyed on a website or social media communication, it is best to examine that information first. If the threat is a statement or behavior that someone observed, it might be best to begin with the observer and perhaps any collaborating witnesses. This will allow the team to interview the student of concern with more information that will make it easier to assess the student’s candor.
Potential sources of information include:
- Interviews with the student who made the threat
- Interviews with involved parties (e.g., persons who have been threatened or witnessed threatening behavior)
- Interviews with parents
- Interviews with teachers and other school staff who know the students
- If the student has a disability, the student’s IEP/504 Plan and consultation with the associated team
- Relevant academic, disciplinary, law enforcement, and other records
- Materials in the student’s locker and/or desk
- Interviews or records from professionals outside the school such as a therapist or counselor
- Interviews with others with whom the student has a relationship, such as peers
- The student’s social media communications and internet activity
Challenge: Determining the Need for A Threat Assessment
Here are some examples of situations where the need for a threat assessment is harder to determine, but other interventions might be appropriate:
- A student tells a group of classmates that he is going to be a serial killer for Halloween. A rumor spreads that the student is planning to kill people on Halloween. Upon interview with the student and witnesses to the original statement, it is clear that the student was only talking about a Halloween costume and expressed no threat to kill anyone. The threat assessment team may need to deal with the spread of rumors that could arouse anxiety in the school community.
- A student writes an essay with a gruesome violent scene from a war. There is no explicit or implied threat to others. The student explains that he was describing a video game he likes to play. A counselor might talk with him about his interest in violence and whether he has thoughts of harming others but his essay and interest in video games is not by itself sufficient to merit a threat assessment. Situations like this must be carefully considered, since there are circumstances where additional information suggests a threat assessment is needed: for example, if the student has been bullied, has recently acquired a weapon, or spoken with classmates about his interest in school shootings.
- A student becomes angry at a teacher for telling him to stop talking and pay attention in class. He uses profanity and storms out of the room. Upon interview, the student describes frustration with the teacher and embarrassment at being called out in class, but expresses no intention of harming the teacher. There is no other incident or report of the student threatening to harm the teacher. The student might be disciplined and referred for counseling, but this incident alone, in the absence of other concerning behavior, does not merit a threat assessment.
Keep in mind that with any scenario, there could be additional facts or context that would change the assessment and lead to a threat assessment. These stories are all intended to illustrate a point, but they are not complete accounts that represent all the information that a team would consider in making a decision.
The potential sources of information are vast, and teams must decide how much time and effort to devote to gathering information based on the nature and seriousness of the threat. It is not realistic to expect teams to gather every available piece of information for all reports of threats. Different threat assessment models offer different guidance on how much information to collect and how to make decisions.
Interviews with parents (or other primary caregivers) are especially important. Parents should be regarded as partners in the threat assessment process because their knowledge and cooperation can be critical to its success.50 It is important to emphasize from the outset the common interests of parents and the team to keep everyone safe and to help their child to be successful. Although a threat assessment should be initiated as soon as possible to prevent potential violence, parents should be notified promptly when a threat assessment is being conducted with their child. Parents have essential background information and perspective on their child’s development and current levels of stress and concern that can help the team assess the seriousness of a threat and formulate an appropriate response to manage the threat and reduce the risk of violence. Parents are often critical to the success of any action or intervention in response to a threat. The team might devise a safety plan that extends beyond the immediate situation and could involve services and supports as well as protective security measures. A safety plan will often require parental collaboration and supervision to be maximally effective.
Resource: Assessment Tools
All assessment tools must be used carefully, with attention to their reliability and validity for the purpose for which they are being used. Because threat assessment is a relatively new field, all tools must be used with caution and it is important to evaluate their use with students across racial, ethnic, cultural, and disability groups. Use this list of assessment tools to get started.
Resource
For information on documenting threats, review these sample threat assessment and management forms.
Stage 3: Intervention
There are three goals for this phase of the threat assessment process:
- Contain the situation and supervise the student to prevent a possible violent act
- Protect and support potential targets
- Provide support and guidance to help the student deal with underlying problems that precipitated the threat9,10
A threat assessment is the beginning of a management process.10,43,67 Once an assessment has been completed, the team uses the information to determine whether the student is at risk of harming someone and develops a plan to mitigate that threat. The plan should be individualized to the student and include recommendations regarding supportive resources, a time frame for check-ins, and specific indicators for discontinuing monitoring. Law enforcement should be immediately notified if it is determined that a student is planning a violent act. If the student is found to have the motive and capability of carrying out the threat, the team will want to take a number of protective actions to prevent violence. The specific actions are based on the nature and circumstances of the threat, but some typical actions include:
- Increase monitoring or supervision of the student to keep the student and others safe.
- Support and counsel the student, to de-escalate the situation and reduce risk.
- Notify law enforcement, if not already involved.
- Search the student, backpack, locker, vehicle, home, etc. for weapons, if appropriate.
- Warn and counsel any intended target, including notification of parents, if applicable.
- Notify relevant school staff.
Temporary removal from school may be an appropriate protective action. This is not a zero tolerance practice; decisions about school removal should be based on the seriousness of the situation and the need to maintain safety. Ideally, a safety plan would allow the student to return to school soon or continue in an alternative setting. However, it should be noted that removal from school may not be an adequate safety measure if there is not appropriate supervision and removal of lethal means. Thus, it may be best for the student to remain in a closely supervised setting (at school or elsewhere) or in the custody of parents who are willing and able to provide supervision appropriate to the situation.
In addition to protective actions, there may be need to address general concern among students, parents, or staff about a threat incident. Threat assessment teams must consider the impact of the case on the school community.
Resource: Communicating About an Incident
To learn how to plan a communications strategy and handle incorrect information sharing, see our School Safety Communications Planning Guide.
There are many different kinds of interventions that a team might use depending on the student’s needs and the nature and circumstances of the threat. Figure 7, on the following page, provides a list of interventions suggested by various authorities.3 Teams might use some variation of these responses or devise their own.
Figure 7: Intervention Type List
Supportive Interventions
- Academic supports
- Counseling
- Apology or restorative action
- Anger management
- Social-emotional learning program
- Anti-bullying interventions
- Mental health services (in school or community)
- Revision to IEP/504 plan
- Behavior plan
- Conflict mediation
- Social skills support
- Mentoring/Advising program
- Support for threatened individuals
- Alternatives to suspension
Prospective Actions
- Warning targeted individuals
- Notifying parents of targeted individuals
- Increased monitoring or supervision
- No-contact agreement
- Transportation change
- Suspension in or outside of school
- Alerting school staff
- Alerting law enforcement
- Searching for weapons
- Schedule change
- Evaluation for psychiatric hospitalization
- Expulsion or school transfer
Law Enforcement Actions
- Review of law enforcement records
- Court-ordered searches
- Court-ordered protective order
- Court-ordered restraining order
- Arrest and/or detention
- Law enforcement investigation
- Law enforcement monitoring
- Diversion program
- Court-ordered removal of firearms
- Charges filed
- Consultation with school staff on safety measures
Resource
To see how threat assessment operates with other programs and interventions as part of a comprehensive school safety program, visit the Integrating Threat Assessment with Selected Programs and Interventions tool.
Common Features of Existing Threat Assessment Programs
Threat assessment models typically include procedures for investigating a threat, determining the seriousness or risk level of a threat, and then acting in response to the threat.45,78-80 Some threat assessment publications more narrowly describe a particular instrument that can be used to classify the risk level of a threat.81 Finally, an increasing number of states are publishing guidelines or protocols specifically for their schools, often drawing upon other models.46,82-84
The United States Secret Service and the FBI reports on threat assessment serve as a framework for many models that have similar principles and recommendations. Our review of the threat assessment literature reveals some common features of threat assessment programs. Threat assessment functions best when it operates in a positive school climate that addresses common problems such as bullying and harassment and when students perceive that the adults in their school are trustworthy, fair, and supportive. Threat assessment publications consistently note the need for a school climate that encourages and facilitates threat reporting.
Threat assessment models also consistently emphasize the importance of gathering information from multiple sources to make well-informed, fact-based decisions. There should be fair and impartial investigations of threat reports with minimal speculation and inference. Threat assessment models often encourage reliance on observable behaviors that indicate planning or preparation to commit an attack rather than efforts to infer dangerousness from indirect indicators such as personality traits and personal interests. Finally, threat assessment is generally regarded as a multi-disciplinary team effort that will draw upon the multiple perspectives and capabilities of individuals in different occupational fields. Decisions should come from the group’s review and analysis of all the available information rather than rest on the shoulders of a single individual.
Features
Comprehensiveness
There is wide variation in the comprehensiveness and specificity of threat assessment models. For example, one study by Pennsylvania State University researchers examined the content of 12 school threat assessment publications.85 They identified components of each model, such as whether there was a definition of threat assessment, a description of the roles of team members, procedures for conducting a threat assessment, and interventions or responses to the threat. The number of components in a model ranged from 8 to 86, with a mean of 39 components. School authorities may need to determine procedures and practices that are not specified in a particular model.
Research Support
A basic question for educators to ask is “What happens after the model is implemented in our schools?” Most threat assessment models are based at least in part on the case study research by the U.S. Secret Service.8,10,43 Case studies of school shootings shed light on the characteristics of students who committed school attacks and suggest what might have stopped them. Case studies of averted school shootings tell us what stopped a shooting from occurring.20 These are valuable studies that contribute to the development of threat assessment procedures and strategies.
However, case studies are a form of research that does not replace the need for direct study of a threat assessment model or process. Despite the widespread use of threat assessment and the proliferation of threat assessment models, few empirical studies test the effectiveness or outcomes of a particular threat assessment model. One exception is the body of research conducted with the Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG), which was developed at the University of Virginia. The CSTAG literature includes two field tests and six controlled studies.25,27-31,86,87 In addition, there are studies of the training process and the reliability and validity of team decisions.34,86,88 Another exception is the German NETWASS model, which has studies of training and implementation.79,89 There is a clear need for more empirical studies of different school threat assessment models and practices. For more information, see the summary of studies in Appendix 2 in the full toolkit PDF.
Challenge
Although complete objectivity in the social sciences is not possible, threat assessment should be as objective as possible. The focus on observable behaviors and a multidisciplinary team help provide a balanced approach. Evaluation of threat assessment outcomes can also help teams understand and correct any bias in implementation.
Selected Threat Assessment Programs*
This toolkit identifies example resources and programs for schools to consider. It does not endorse any particular model of threat assessment. Other resources not found on this list may also be useful.
Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines (CSTAG): This model was developed in 2001 by a research team at the University of Virginia with the goal of integrating recommendations from FBI and Secret Service studies of school shootings with practical advice obtained from educators working in Virginia public schools.45 The original manual, including a five-step decision tree and standard forms, was published in 2006, with updated guidelines released in 2018.45 This model is designed to help school-based multi-disciplinary teams gather information to determine whether a student’s threat can be readily resolved as a transient threat that is not serious or will require more extensive assessment and intervention as a serious, substantive threat. Teams take a problem-solving approach to help students resolve the problem or conflict underlying the threat rather than a punitive, zero-tolerance approach. There is a body of peer-reviewed research supporting training, implementation, and outcomes for this model.
* Dr. Cornell discloses that he is the primary developer of the Comprehensive School Threat Assessment Guidelines.
FBI: In 2000, the FBI published a seminal report on school shootings, The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective, which recommended a threat assessment approach rather than a profiling approach.8 In this publication, the FBI proposed a four-pronged approach to assessment, which involves gathering information about the individual student as well as family, school, and social influences. In 2017, the FBI published a practical guide for threat assessment and management, Making prevention a reality: Identifying, assessing and managing the threat of targeted attacks.43
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC): The United States Secret Service has a National Threat Assessment Center that has published a series of reports on school shootings and threat assessment. This guide to creating a model, sometimes referred to as the federal model or Secret Service model, was described in Enhancing school safety using a threat assessment model: An operational guide for preventing targeted school violence, released in 2018. The NTAC identified eight key steps in establishing school-based threat assessment, summarized in Section 1 of this toolkit. They further recommended organizing information gathering around 13 key themes. The National Threat Assessment Center has also released an updated study of school shootings and a report on averted shootings.36,37
NETWorks Against School Shootings (NETWASS): Developed between 2009 and 2013 by a research team at Freie Universität Berlin (Germany), this model emphasizes early intervention with students experiencing a psychosocial crisis. Threats and leaking behavior are seen as indicators the student might be on a pathway to violence. The foundation of the program is the creation of a school-based organizational structure for crisis intervention by educating staff to (1) recognize a student in crisis, (2) assess accompanying warning behaviors, and (3) implement appropriate supportive measures. Although not well-known in the U.S., this model has research support and offers a different perspective on threat assessment with its emphasis on training all school staff in identifying and helping students in a psychosocial crisis.11,12
Salem-Keizer Cascade Model (SK Cascade Model): In 2000, John Van Dreal, working in the Salem-Keizer (WA) School District, led the development of a threat assessment protocol in coordination with local law enforcement and mental health agencies. The Salem-Keizer Cascade model consists of standardized assessment protocols and safety planning procedures to provide an immediate and systematic response to a student posing a threat to others. The process is overseen and administered by a collaborative team of schools, law enforcement, mental health providers, the judiciary, and juvenile corrections. The goals of the program include (1) identifying and assessing threats to determine the level of concern and action needed, (2) coordinating resources to produce an effective response to the threat, and (3) maintaining a sense of psychological safety among all school members, thus creating a supportive learning environment.80 Two threat assessment teams are used; one is in the individual school (Level 1) and the other is based in the community (Level 2). If a Level 2 assessment is requested, it is conducted primarily at the school site by an investigative team with members from the school staff and the larger community as appropriate.
Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTRA): J. Kevin Cameron established the North American Center for Threat Assessment and Trauma Response (NACTATR) in Canada in 1999 and began the development of the Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTRA). This model focuses on the interdependence of micro and macro environments. At stage one of this model, the team conducts a micro-assessment to determine whether the threatening individual poses a risk to carry out the threat, followed by a macro-assessment concerned with historical and foundational risk enhancers such as the level of anxiety or tension in the social environment. Assessment proceeds through three stages:
- Data collection and immediate risk-reducing interventions by a site-specific VTRA team and the local police.
- Specialized risk evaluation completed by VTRA team members or partners to assess overall functioning of the threatener and to identify interventions to stabilize and maintain the student’s cognitive, emotional, and behavioral well-being.
- Comprehensive intervention, review, and follow-up during which a long-term multi-disciplinary intervention plan is developed, monitored, and revised as needed.
Table 3: Quick Guide to Primary Resources for Selected Threat Assessment Models
| Model | Related Publications |
|---|---|
| CSTAG | Cornell, D.G. (2018). Comprehensive school threat assessment guidelines: Intervention and support to prevent violence. Charlottesville, VA: School Threat Assessment Consultants LLC |
| FBI | O’Toole, M.E. (2000). The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective. Quantico, VA: National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| NTAC | National Threat Assessment Center (2018). Enhancing school safety using a threat assessment model: An operational guide for preventing targeted violence. U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security |
| NETWASS | Leuschner, V., Bondu, R., Schroer-Hippel, M., Panno, J., Neumetzler, K., Fisch, S., School, J., & Scheithauer, H. (2011). Prevention of homicidal violence in schools in Germany: The Berlin leaking Project and the Networks Against School Shootings Project (NETWASS). New Directions for Youth Development, 2011 (129) |
| STAS | Van Dreal, J. (Ed.) (2016). Assessing student threats: Implementing the Salem-Keizer-System, (2nd ed.). Rowman and Littlefield Publishers |
| VTRA | Cameron, K. (2018). Violent threat risk assessment (VTRA) protocol: A community based approach (10th ed.). North American Center for Threat Assessment and Trauma Response |
State Guidance on Threat Assessment
Several states have legislation related to threat assessment, and many have published threat assessment guidelines or protocols specifically for their schools, often drawing upon NTAC guidance. Others require that their school staff members be trained in a particular model. Table 4 features a list of states with information about their threat assessment resources and/or guidelines.
Disclaimer: The list in Table 4 is intended as a starting point for readers to learn about threat assessment in different states and is not intended as an endorsement of a particular model. Additionally, this list may not be up to date since state practices and policies may change.
Resource
Remember that your state may have specific guidance on threat assessment. See Appendix 4 in the full toolkit PDF for recent state guidance.
Table 4: List of Threat Assessment Resources by State
| State | Threat Assessment Efforts | Contact Agency or Organization |
|---|---|---|
| Alabama | Use of a threat assessment approach is recommended | Office of the Governor |
| Alaska | No threat assessment information found | Alaska Department of Education and Early Development |
| Arizona | Links to threat assessment trainings, forms, and online education program | Arizona Department of Education |
| Arkansas | Link to threat assessment trainings | Arkansas Center for School Safety |
| California | Threat assessment mentioned as part of comprehensive planning | California Department of Education |
| Colorado | Colorado Threat Assessment and Management | Colorado School Safety Resource Center (CTAMP) |
| Connecticut | Links to threat assessment resources | Connecticut Department of School Safety and Security |
| Delaware | Links to threat assessment resources | Delaware Department of Education |
| Florida | Links to standardized, statewide threat assessment protocol | Florida Department of Education- Office of Safe Schools |
| Georgia | Link to resource about targeted school violence | Georgia Department of Education |
| Hawaii | No threat assessment information found | Hawaii State Department of Education |
| Idaho | Provides 8-hour training based on current research in the field as well as links to resources | Idaho Office of School Safety and Field Security |
| Illinois | Links to threat assessment resources | Illinois School and Campus Safety Resource Center |
| Indiana | Link to threat assessment resource | Indiana School Safety Hub |
| Iowa | Provides threat assessment training for staff | Iowa Department of Education |
| Kansas | General school safety site with links to external threat assessment resources | Kansas Safe and Secure Schools Unit |
| Kentucky | Each school must have a threat assessment team | Kentucky Center for Safe Schools |
| Louisiana | Links to threat assessment resources | Louisiana Center for Safe Schools |
| Maine | Link to threat assessment resources and videos | Maine School Safety Center |
| Maryland | Mandated model policy for the establishment of threat assessment teams in each school district | Maryland Center for School Safety |
| Massachusetts | Section on threat assessment; report on school safety | Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education |
| Michigan | No threat assessment information found. | Michigan Department of Education |
| Minnesota | Trainings are available through the Minnesota School Safety Center. | Minnesota School Safety Center |
| Mississippi | Link to threat assessment resources on school safety page | Mississippi Department of Education- Division of School Safety |
| Missouri | Provides behavioral risk assessment training and links to threat assessment resources | Missouri School Boards’ Association Center for Education Safety |
| Montana | School safety and emergency preparedness plans including references to threat assessment | Montana Office of Public Instruction |
| Nebraska | Provides threat assessment training for schools | Nebraska School Safety- Nebraska DOE |
| Nevada | Link to threat assessment resources | Nevada Department of Education- School Safety |
| New Hampshire | School Safety Preparedness Task Force Report, which recommends use of a threat assessment task force | New Hampshire Department of Education |
| New Jersey | Threat Assessment training available | New Jersey Department of Education- Office of School Preparedness and Emergency Planning |
| New Mexico | Safe school plan guidance with link to threat assessment resource | New Mexico Public Education Department- Safe Schools |
| New York | Links to threat assessment resources | The New York State Center for School Safety |
| North Carolina | Schools are mandated to establish threat assessment teams; addressed in school safety resource guide | North Carolina Center for Safer Schools |
| North Dakota | General school safety guidance, no specific mention of threat assessment | North Dakota Department of Public Instruction- School Safety and Security |
| Ohio | Ohio School Threat Assessment Training provides free threat assessment training for all public schools | Ohio Office of the Attorney General |
| Oklahoma | Oklahoma Behavioral Threat Assessment with link to online training modules | Oklahoma State Department of Education- School Safety and Security |
| Oregon | Schools are required to have multi-disciplinary student safety assessment systems to assess students who threaten violence | Oregon School Safety and Prevention System |
| Pennsylvania | Threat assessment is mandated | Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency |
| Rhode Island | Threat assessment guidance trainings mentioned on Department of Education website | Rhode Island Department of Education |
| South Carolina | School-based Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management: Best Practices Guide for South Carolina K-12 schools | South Carolina Department of Education |
| South Dakota | Threat assessment training available | South Dakota Department of Education |
| Tennessee | Guidance on the SAVE Act, including links to threat assessment resources | Tennessee Department of Education |
| Texas | School threat assessment teams are mandated; Model Policies and Procedures to Establish and Train on Threat Assessment | Texas School Safety Center |
| Utah | School Safety Center promotes the use of threat assessment | Utah State Board of Education |
| Vermont | Threat assessment training available as well as link to threat assessment resources, including publications and | Vermont School Safety Center |
| Virginia | School threat assessment teams are mandated; Threat Assessment and Management in Virginia Public Schools: Model Policies, Procedures, and Guidelines | Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services |
| Washington | School threat assessment programs are mandated; webpage gives links to district policies, procedures, and area threat assessment coordinators | Washington State Office of Superintedent of Public Instruction |
| West Virginia | Sample protocols for threat assessments | West Virginia Department of Education |
| Wisconsin | School threat assessment teams are recommended with guidance in the Wisconsin School Threat Assessment Protocol | Wisconsin Department of Justice |
| Wyoming | General health and safety webpage | Wyoming Department of Education |
| Washington, D.C. | School Emergency Response Plan and Management Guide with section on threat assessment | District of Columbia Public Schools- Student Safety |
Student Rights
This section describes how threat assessments can be conducted in a manner that protects student rights. Although a legal analysis of all relevant rights is beyond the scope of this toolkit, some key topics are reviewed, including the right to due process, compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the First Amendment right to free speech, and the rights of students with disabilities to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). The interpretations of federal and state law presented here are consistent with the documents cited in this section; however, laws and regulations are complex, subject to change, and might be applied differently across jurisdictions. School authorities are advised to rely on their legal counsel when implementing threat assessment.
Due Process
The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states in section 1: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” The due process clause in this amendment is the basis for many court rulings that limit government authority. Most relevant to schools is that they must follow due process in educational practices such as disciplining students. The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee public education for all students, but individual states typically provide some right to public education for their youth, and since education is considered a valuable property, the due process requirement is applicable.90 School law around due process is complex, but some general points can be noted.91
Action Step
Threat assessment teams should ensure they are giving students due process. Teams should make every effort to interview students who have been reported as making a threat to allow them to explain themselves. Teams should also use standardized procedures to ensure fairness and impartiality.
In the area of school discipline, a suspension or removal from school of 10 days or more is generally considered so substantial as to require due process.91 This requirement is widely recognized for special education, where there are specific due process requirements, but due process might also be applied to students not receiving special education services. One implication is that a student is entitled to a fair hearing in which they can present their side of the case, either to deny or lessen what they have been accused of doing. The extent and formality of the hearing depends on the circumstances and the seriousness of the disciplinary consequences. However, schools are allowed to suspend a student immediately when necessary to protect others and preserve order in the school.91 In these cases, it is sufficient that the principal has reviewed the infraction with the student and given the student an opportunity to present their version of the facts.
Although the court cases on due process have not specifically addressed threat assessment, and threat assessment is not a disciplinary process, it seems wise and reasonable for threat assessment teams to interview a student reported to have made a threat and to give that student an opportunity to explain themselves. However, there may be cases when it is not possible to interview the student (e.g., the student is not available or cannot be located), and this should not stop the team from gathering information from other sources and taking any actions that seem appropriate to maintain immediate safety.
Due process requires that school discipline be fair and impartial, so it seems reasonable to expect that threat assessment procedures would also be fair and impartial.91 Schools can demonstrate fairness and impartiality by using standardized procedures consistently for each student and by doing a diligent job of gathering information and making decisions based on facts. Schools can also conduct reviews of their threat assessment programs to make sure that student outcomes are equitable across demographic groups defined by race, ethnicity, disability status, and other characteristics. Suggestions for evaluating threat assessment programs are found in Section 3.
Student Records
Schools using threat assessment should maintain high-quality records in order to document and ensure the protection of student privacy and due process rights. An FBI report on the general practice of threat assessment emphasizes the need for teams to establish consistent documentation practices and procedures. Standardized practices are helpful for two basic reasons.43 One is that standardized practices can help improve the quality of threat assessments so that the team looks carefully at the facts of each case and does not overlook any steps in their process of assessment and intervention. Second, standardized practices can help assure fairness and equity in conducting threat assessments so that all students receive the same review and treatment.
Any use of forms or templates should be standardized across cases. Case files should be kept confidential and stored securely, with access limited to those with a legitimate need for the information. It is good practice to include who is entitled to view and share assessment records. A formal report might acknowledge that decisions were made based on information known to the team at the time of the assessment and that any change in circumstances or additional information could change team recommendations.
Challenge
Good records are necessary to protect student privacy rights. There are important concerns about the protection of student records and adherence to FERPA. Threat assessment policies should include information on who is able to view and share threat assessment records.
Action Step
Documentation of each threat assessment case should include:
- What, when, where, how, and from whom information was gathered
- A complete report of the threat, including date, time, target, and witnesses
- Preservation of evidence (e.g., copies of emails, screenshots of texts)
- Decisions made by team, including reference to the supporting data
- Interventions taken (such as safety measures, support services, and recommendations to parents)
- Time frame and specific plans for re-evaluation
Documentation of threat assessment team activities serves multiple purposes, including:
- Aiding in the identification of trends and patterns
- Maintaining the quality and consistency of threat assessment practices
- Providing evidence of the scope of the assessment
- Providing evidence that established procedures and privacy protections were followed for each case
- Guiding future training and practice needs
- Guiding long-term management of cases
- Improving continuity of interventions with students who may present more than once
- Protecting against liability
Challenge
Liability is an important consideration that can have a huge impact on practitioner decisions. The concept of liability is a legal means of encouraging best practices, which is the best way to protect student rights. Liability is minimized when a team follows recognized practice standards and makes reasonable decisions consistent with those standards. It is essential that teams keep records that are sufficient to document the assessment they conducted, what they concluded, and what actions they took in response.
Temporary removal from school may be an appropriate protective action. This is not a zero-tolerance practice; decisions about school removal should be based on the seriousness of the situation and the need to maintain safety. Ideally, a safety plan would allow the student to return to school soon or continue in an alternative setting. However, it should be noted that removal from school may not be an adequate safety measure if there is no appropriate supervision and removal of lethal means. Thus, it may be best for the student to remain in a closely supervised setting (at school or elsewhere) or in the custody of parents who are willing and able to provide supervision appropriate to the situation.
In addition to protective actions, there may be a need to address general concerns among students, parents, or staff about a threat incident. Threat assessment teams must consider the impact of the case on the school community.
There is no single established practice for maintaining threat assessment records. Schools have multiple options but must always comply with federal and state restrictions. If threat assessment records are placed in the student’s educational record, they are subject to FERPA restrictions. However, FERPA allows schools to store threat assessment records outside of the educational record as law enforcement unit records, which are not subject to FERPA restrictions. When the national cadre of experts was polled about record-keeping (see Appendix 3 for full survey results), the most preferred practice was a behavioral intervention folder separate from the student’s educational record (34%) or a confidential mental health/risk assessment folder (30%). Not recommended by most experts was to keep the threat assessment record in a school professional’s individual records (85% not recommended), exclusively in a law enforcement unit record (82% not recommended), or exclusively in a student educational record (70% not recommended). There is an ongoing need to establish best practices for record-keeping and information sharing.
Ideally, the record system can be used to generate a database of threat assessment cases and outcomes. Such a system can be used to evaluate threat assessment trends, program fidelity, and equity of outcomes across student groups for each school and district.
Figure 8: How Should TA Records be Maintained?
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)
FERPA is a federal law designed to protect the privacy rights of students and their parents by regulating access to the student’s education records. FERPA applies to all educational institutions (primarily public schools) that receive federal funding from the Department of Education. The statute is found under 20 USC § 1232(g) and the supporting regulations are found under 34 C.F.R. Part 99. FERPA gives parents the right to review their child’s education records, request changes to those records, and control what information in the records can be disclosed to others outside of school authorities. FERPA also transfers parent control of the records to the student when the student turns 18 or enters college.
The student’s education record is broadly defined to include written records of the student’s academic performance, disciplinary actions, health conditions, and parent information. Personally Identifiable Information (PII) refers to any information that reasonably identifies the student, such as name, address, date of birth, and social security number. In most circumstances, school authorities must have parental consent to disclose any information about a student that includes PII. However, with parental consent, school authorities can disclose any information in the student’s record.
Threat assessment teams must operate within FERPA’s legal framework (as well as any state privacy laws). There are three ways that FERPA is relevant to the threat assessment process:
- Access to Education Records
Members of the threat assessment team generally have access to a student’s education records as part of their assessment process. They will want to review a student’s academic history, discipline record, and information about mental health conditions and disability-related needs. If threat assessment team members are also part of the school’s staff, then they are already authorized to have access to student education records. However, some threat assessment teams include law enforcement officers or community-based mental health service providers who are not school employees.
In these situations, there should be a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that places clear limits on their access to education records. Information from student records should be relevant to the threat assessment process, and it must be used only for threat assessment purposes (including interventions or services that are indicated by the threat assessment). For example, a school resource officer serving on a threat assessment team cannot use information from student education records for purposes beyond the scope of the threat assessment.
- Creation of Education Records
A school may choose to place information gained from a threat assessment in the student’s education record. This information might include threat assessment forms, reports, interviews, or other documents created or obtained in the course of a threat assessment. Once the information is in the student’s education record, it becomes subject to FERPA protections. School staff members can maintain personal notes of their observations or their work that are not part of the education record if the notes are used solely by the staff member and not shared with others. For example, a school counselor might have session notes from a counseling session or interview with a student that are maintained in the counselor’s files; if these notes are used only by the counselor and not shared with others, they are not considered part of the student’s education record. These notes are still subject to the counselor’s professional standards or any school district policy or regulations apart from FERPA.
FERPA allows schools to maintain threat assessment information outside of the student’s education record in a separate record maintained by a “law enforcement unit”. The term “law enforcement unit” could refer to records held by a school resource officer but could also include any individual in the school designated to maintain records related to physical safety or security. These records are maintained by the school and should not be confused with records maintained by a law enforcement agency outside of a school. There are advantages and disadvantages of using a law enforcement unit to maintain threat assessment records. The advantage of a law enforcement unit record is that this information can be freely shared and is not restricted by FERPA, but the corresponding disadvantage is that student privacy of this information is not protected by FERPA.
- Sharing Information from Education Records
Sharing educational records should always be done to protect the health and safety of others. Threat assessment teams often want to share information with persons who have an interest in the threatening situation, such as the identified target(s) of the threat. If the target is a juvenile, the team would want to share information with the parents as well. FERPA regulations provide some guidance on information sharing:
School authorities can disclose any information in the student’s record if they have parental consent (or consent of the student if the student is 18 or older). Threat assessment teams should strive to develop a collaborative relationship with parents and seek their agreement to share information for specific purposes (e.g., facilitating community-based mental health services for their child or reassuring the parents of a targeted student that an incident has been resolved). However, FERPA allows school authorities to reveal personally identifying information, such as a student’s name, without parental consent if there is a health or safety emergency.
It is important to recognize that a student’s education record does not include all information about a student known to the school. There are sources of information that are not considered part of the student’s education record. Notably, the personal observations of school staff (e.g., information a teacher or counselor gains in talking to a student or observing a student) is not part of the education record. However, if personal observations are included in the student’s education record, they are protected by FERPA. A common example might be a teacher who observes an argument between two students. The teacher might contact the parents of the two students to share information about the argument and discuss appropriate responses. These conversations could take place without revealing information from either student’s education records.
Some school threat assessment teams might include members who are not employees of their school district, such as law enforcement officers and community-based mental health professionals. Information from educational records that is relevant to the threat assessment team can be shared with these team members when it is clear that it serves a legitimate educational interest, such as maintaining safety and order in the school.50 When outside members serve on teams, it is advisable for threat assessment team members to sign an agreement that such information can only be used for threat assessment purposes and cannot be redisclosed outside of the team.50,92
Resources
For additional FERPA resources, refer to the U.S. Department of Education’s Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A Guide to the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act for Elementary and Secondary Schools.
Also see School Resource Officers, School Law Enforcement Units, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and A Quick Guide to Information Sharing During Threat Reporting & Assessment.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
HIPAA is a federal law designed to protect sensitive patient health information from being disclosed without patient consent or knowledge. HIPAA restricts protected health information (i.e., demographic information created by a healthcare provider relating to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual) from being shared without individual authorization except in the case of a permitted disclosure. Healthcare providers include those “who electronically transmit health information in connection with certain transactions. These transactions include claims, benefit eligibility inquiries, referral authorization requests, and other transactions for which HHS has established standards under the HIPAA Transactions Rule.”
Threat assessment teams must operate within HIPAA’s legal framework when they are seeking healthcare records; however, HIPAA permits disclosures by healthcare providers who submit electronic records under HIPAA’s privacy rule in the case of a serious threat to health or safety. Covered entities may disclose protected health information that they believe is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to a person or the public when such disclosure is made to someone they believe can prevent or lessen the threat (including the target of the threat) would most likely include a serious threat to health and safety.93
Resource
To learn more about HIPPA, visit the CDC’s HIPPA resource page.
School authorities are advised to consult their legal counsel and review the federal government’s “Joint Guidance on the Application of FERPA and HIPAA to Student Health Records.” In general, HIPAA does not apply to schools because schools are not HIPAA covered entities.94 If schools collect student health information that is contained in student education records, that information is covered by FERPA and is exempt from HIPAA. Even if the school employs a third-party healthcare provider to work with students, the resulting records qualify as education records subject to FERPA rather than HIPAA. One exception might be if a school has an on-site health clinic that maintains separate records that are not placed in the student’s education record.
Duty to Warn
In many states, mental health service providers have a legal duty to protect third parties from violence if the provider has knowledge that they have been threatened. The extent of this duty and the circumstances under which it applies vary according to state laws. School districts must examine their state laws and regulations for guidance.
Resource
For a comparison of state laws, see the “Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn” brief by the National Conference of State Legislatures.
The duty to warn statutes generally do not apply to teachers or administrators but might apply to school counselors, nurses, psychologists, or social workers depending on the state. Even if there is no state law determining whether school authorities must warn a potential victim, there is always the possibility of a civil lawsuit by an injured party. In these circumstances, the judge or jury would decide what the school threat assessment team should have done and whether they are liable for any injury to the victim.
Research Finding
An important case addressing mental health and the law, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 1974 and 1976, reflects the general principle that confidentiality is secondary to safety.
A University of California student who was infatuated with Tatiana Tarasoff told his therapist that he wanted to kill her for spurning his advances. The therapist told the campus police but did not warn Tarasoff. After the student killed Tarasoff, her family sued the University, the police department, and the therapist. The therapist was found liable for failing to warn Tarasoff. The California Supreme Court first asserted that the therapist had a “duty to warn” potential threat victims and later articulated a “duty to protect” that included other actions that a mental health professional might take beyond a warning to protect a potential victim of client violence. Over the years, cases in other states have addressed different circumstances in which a Tarasoff duty would or would not apply.95 Threat assessment team members should be aware of the Tarasoff duties to warn and protect in their state.
For more information on Tarasoff duties, refer to The Tarasoff Rule: The Implications of Interstate Variation and Gaps in Professional Training.96
The concept of a duty to warn is based on the widely cited Tarasoff case, which involved a college student who was threatened and later murdered by a disappointed suitor. This case established the idea that mental health professionals have a duty to warn potential victims who have been threatened by their client, or in some circumstances, a broader duty to take reasonable steps to protect the potential victim from harm. Examples of actions taken to protect someone could include notifying law enforcement, seeking civil commitment or involuntary hospitalization, or providing mental health services or other interventions intended to defuse the threat and reduce the risk of violence.
Reservations About Warning a Threatened Party
Sometimes school authorities are concerned about revealing the identity of a student who has made a threat. These concerns might be based on the belief that the student’s identity is protected by FERPA or the fear that such a disclosure would lead to a negative reaction by the threatened individual or the individual’s parents. Each of these concerns must be weighed against the greater need to protect a potential victim.
If there is an immediate risk to the health or safety of any student, defined as a reasonable belief that an “articulable and significant threat” to a student(s) health or safety exists, FERPA allows the threat assessment team to disclose the student’s identity without parent consent. The law restricts this disclosure only to individuals who need the information to protect involved students.97 Schools should document the need for this disclosure and to whom the information was given. Such information can be shared with law enforcement and emergency professionals when there are genuine health or safety concerns for the student or others. Once the threat is resolved and there is no longer an immediate safety risk, the team must follow regular FERPA guidance regarding release of any further information.
Action Step
School district personnel and educators should refer to their school attorneys for additional legal guidance.
Sometimes, school authorities are concerned that revealing the name of a student could disturb the warned individual or parents and perhaps instigate a retaliative act of aggression. In these cases, the team should consider the negative consequences of not warning the individual or parents. The most obvious negative consequence is that the unwarned individual will be at increased risk of harm, but another is that the individual or parents could become aware of the threat from other sources and carry out the anticipated act of aggression anyway.
Action Step: Managing the Impact of Threats
Part of the function of the threat assessment team is to manage the impact of the threat on individuals who have been threatened, as well as the general school community, to mitigate the impact of a threat on the well-being and security of others. Threat assessment teams should routinely assess the impact of a warning on threatened individuals and their parents, and provide support and reassurance to lessen fear, anger, or other negative responses.
By not warning the threatened party, the team loses the opportunity to communicate with them and attempt to prevent the retaliative act. The failure to warn could also arouse anger toward school authorities and jeopardize their ability to work collaboratively to resolve the threat.
In the case of threats that are judged not to be serious, threat assessment teams may want to notify the threatened individual and parents even though a warning is not needed for safety reasons, and is not legally required. A threat notification can be distinguished from a threat warning. A notification involves informing the individual about a threat incident to clarify what has occurred. The purpose of a notification is to defuse potential rumors or exaggerated reports that could inflame the situation and maintain credibility and alliance with the threatened individual and parents.
Resource
For more information on threat assessment and FERPA, see the FAQs about Threat Assessment and FERPA tool.
Free Speech
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” The Supreme Court affirmed in Tinker v Des Moines (1969) that students have free speech rights with the ruling that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” However, the right to free speech is not completely uncontrolled, as students sometimes think. Schools can regulate the speech of their students under certain conditions which are spelled out in various court rulings.91 School districts will want to consult their legal counsel for specific court rulings as well as state laws that apply to them. The most important principle, however, is that schools must determine whether a statement or expression (such as clothing, artwork, or music) is disruptive to learning or the learning environment. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court ruled that schools cannot discipline students for off-campus speech unless it “materially disrupts classwork or involved substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”98
An important distinction is that public schools represent the government and must regulate speech within the limits of the First Amendment, while private schools do not have the same Constitutional limits on their ability to restrict student speech.
Challenge
There are some categories of speech that are not protected by the First Amendment. School authorities should be aware that these categories exist and could be a basis for action. Speech that is not protected, or is less strongly protected, by the First Amendment include obscenity, child pornography, fraud, speech that violates intellectual property laws, and speech that is integral to illegal conduct, or incites imminent unlawful action.
Threats represent a complicated form of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment if they are considered “true threats.” A true threat is “a statement which, in the entire context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person.” (290 F.3d at 1077). Furthermore, “It is not necessary that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat; the only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.” (290 F.3d at 1075). A threat which is merely exaggeration used to attract attention is not considered a true threat. From a threat assessment perspective, a threat that is obviously a joke would not be a true threat, although it might be subject to disciplinary action if it was disruptive to the school environment or was hurtful to the recipient (e.g., verbal bullying or harassment).
Students with Disabilities
Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)
Students with disabilities are entitled to a Free and Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) comparable to the education of students without disabilities. There are complex legal and procedural protections of these students under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Some key elements of these laws and regulations will be reviewed here. Districts are encouraged to rely on their legal counsel for interpretation of relevant federal and state laws and regulations that apply to their students. In every case, school authorities will have to consider the unique facts specific to the student and the circumstances of the threat.
Under IDEA, schools must provide FAPE to all students between ages 3 and 21 who need special education services due to a disability. The existence of a disability and the determination of services are documented in an Individualized Education Program (IEP). The IEP must be carefully considered when evaluating a student who has been referred for a threat assessment. The first priority for the school is to assess risk and take any immediate safety precautions, but it is also important to consider the possible role of the student’s disability. The student’s special education status and related history of services can be relevant to understanding the threat situation and planning a response to reduce risk. NASP (2020) recommends that an expert in special education, such as a school psychologist, serve on the threat assessment team. Although threat assessment teams cannot modify a student’s IEP, it is appropriate for the threat assessment team to provide information to the special education staff who are working with the student. In some cases, a revision of the student’s IEP might be warranted.
Titles II and III of the ADA
Titles II and III of the ADA present a legal definition of a threat assessment that is applied when a district wants to remove a student with a disability from school because of safety concerns. “In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public entity must make an individualized assessment, based on objective evidence, to ascertain: the nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk” (CFR § 35.139b).
In conducting a threat assessment of a student with a disability, threat assessment teams will want to document that their assessment was consistent with this regulation, showing that it was based on objective evidence (such as observations of student behaviors and statements) and that it ascertained with reasonable accuracy the nature, duration, and severity of the risk. The team will want to consider whether any interventions or services might reduce the risk as an alternative to removing the student from school. The documentation of the threat assessment should include relevant information about the student’s disability and the basis for determining that the student posed a serious risk of harming someone, justifying any proposed interventions such as a change in school placement.
Challenge: Context Matters
Threat assessment teams should be mindful to conduct threat assessments appropriately to ensure that the rights of students with disabilities are protected. Conducting a proper threat assessment is the best way to protect both student rights and potential victims.
Manifestation Determinations
If the response to a threat by students receiving special education services involves a change in school placement, the school will need to conduct a manifestation determination review (MDR; 34 CFR § 300.530 (e)). The threshold for a change in school placement is reached when a student has been suspended for more than ten days. If a student has been suspended for fewer than ten days, but the total for the school year is going to exceed ten days, then an MDR is needed. An MDR is a process of reviewing all relevant information regarding the relationship between a student’s disability and the behavior prompting disciplinary action. The MDR is conducted by the student’s IEP team, including the parent. There are two questions considered by the MDR:
- Was the behavior caused by, or directly and substantially related to, the student’s disability?
- Was the behavior a direct result of the school’s failure to implement the IEP?
If the answer to either question is “yes”, the behavior is regarded as a manifestation of the student’s disability, and the school is not permitted to make the change in placement without parental permission. Moreover, the school must take immediate steps to amend the IEP and provide appropriate services for the student. If the answer to both questions is “no”, the school is permitted to make the change in placement without parental permission. In cases where there is no change in placement, the school is not obligated to conduct an MDR, but it is good practice to review the student’s IEP, and when appropriate, the threat assessment team might make recommendations for the IEP team to consider. It is noteworthy that threat assessments typically do not lead to suspension out of school.36,38,49
Interim Alternative Placements
Safety is the top priority when it comes to student threats of violence. Under special circumstances, federal law allows schools to place a student with a disability in an interim alternative educational setting (IAES) for up to 45 school days even if the student’s behavior was judged to be a manifestation of the student’s disability (34 CFR § 300.530 (g)). According to IDEA, a student can be placed in an IAES if one of the following special circumstances applies:
- The student carried a dangerous weapon to school or possessed a weapon at school (including school premises or at a school function). A dangerous weapon is defined in the U.S. criminal code as one that is readily capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, excluding a pocketknife with a blade of less than 2.5 inches.
- The student knowingly possessed or used illegal drugs, or sold or solicited sale of a controlled substance, while at school, on school premises, or at a school function.
- The student inflicted serious bodily injury on another person while at school, on school premises, or at a school function. Serious bodily injury is defined in the U.S. criminal code as involving in a substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, extended or obvious disfigurement, or extended loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
In practice, there are few occasions to pursue an IAES. A student who qualifies for an IAES might be removed from school by the judicial system due to being arrested and placed in juvenile detention.
Honig Injunctions
If school authorities are sufficiently concerned that allowing a student to remain in school is going to result in injury to others, the school can seek a court order to change the student’s placement. This court order is called a Honig injunction after a noted case, Honig v Doe, 559 IDELR 231 (U.S. 1988). A Honig injunction might be used in an extremely serious situation where there is not enough time to pursue other remedies such as an IAES.
Although there is much attention to the legal complexities of removing a student from school, it should be emphasized that threat assessment is not focused on school removal. School removal is a last resort when other efforts have been tried or ruled out. Furthermore, school removal can be counterproductive since the threat assessment team may lose the opportunity to monitor and support the student. Some notable school shootings (e.g., in Red Lake, Minnesota; Parkland, Florida; and Springfield, Oregon) were committed by students who had been suspended or expelled from school. The goal of a threat assessment is to prevent violence, and prevention is best accomplished by helping the distressed student and resolving the problem or conflict that underlies the threat. A randomized controlled study found that students who received a threat assessment were substantially more likely to receive counseling and less likely to be given a long-term suspension or transferred to a different school than students who made threats in schools not using a threat assessment approach.86
Challenge: School Removal
School removal should only be used as a last resort when other interventions have been tried or ruled out. It may result in the lost opportunity to monitor and support the student.
These references cover the entire toolkit, not just this section.
- Vossekuil, B., Fein, R. A., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2002). Final report and findings of the safe school initiative: Implications for the prevention of school attacks in the United States | Office of Justice Programs (195287; p. 63). U.S. Department of Education and United States Secret Service Safe School Initiative. https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/final-report-and-findings-safe-school-initiative-implications
- Posner, K., Brown, G. K., Stanley, B., Brent, D. A., Yershova, K. V., Oquendo, M. A., Currier, G. W., Melvin, G. A., Greenhill, L., Shen, S., & Mann, J. J. (2011). The Columbia–suicide severity rating scale: Initial validity and internal consistency findings from three multisite studies with adolescents and adults. American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(12), 1266–1277. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2011.10111704
- Erbacher, T., Singer, J., & Poland, S. (2014). Suicide in schools: A practitioner’s guide to multi-level prevention, assessment, intervention, and postvention (1st ed.). Routledge. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/mono/10.4324/9780203702970/suicide-schools-terri-erbacher-jonathan-singer-scott-poland
- Preventing suicide: Guidelines for administrators and crisis teams. (n.d.). National Association of School Psychologists (NASP). Retrieved January 31, 2022, from https://www.nasponline.org/resources-and-publications/resources-and-podcasts/school-safety-and-crisis/mental-health-resources/preventing-youth-suicide/preventing-suicide-guidelines-for-administrators-and-crisis-teams
- The school counselor and suicide prevention/awareness—American School Counselor Association (ASCA). (n.d.). Retrieved January 31, 2022, from https://www.schoolcounselor.org/Standards-Positions/Position-Statements/ASCA-Position-Statements/The-School-Counselor-and-Suicide-Prevention-Awaren
- Wang, K., Chen, Y., Zhang, J., & Oudekerk, B. (2020). Indicators of school crime and safety: 2019 (NCES 2020063). National Center for Education Statistics. https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2020063
- Nekvasil, E. K., & Cornell, D. G. (2012). Student reports of peer threats of violence: Prevalence and outcomes. Journal of School Violence, 11(4), 357–375. https://doi.org/10.1080/15388220.2012.706764
- Modzeleski, W., & Randazzo, M. R. (2018). School threat assessment in the USA: Lessons learned from 15 years of teaching and using the federal model to prevent school shootings. Contemporary School Psychology, 22(2), 109–115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-018-0188-8
- O’Toole, M. E. (1999). The school shooter: A threat assessment perspective. For full text:
http://www.https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED446352 - Fein, R. A., Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W. S., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W., & Reddy, M. (2004). Threat assessment in schools: A guide to managing threatening situations and to creating safe school climates. U.S. Department of Education. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED515943
- National Threat Assessment Center. (2018). Enhancing school safety using a threat assessment model: An operational guide for preventing targeted school violence. CISA. U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security. https://www.cisa.gov/publication/enhancing-school-safety-using-threat-assessment-model-operational-guide-preventing
- National Threat Assessment Center. (2019). Protecting America’s schools: A U.S. Secret Service analysis of targeted school violence (p. 68). U.S. Secret Service, Department of Homeland Security. https://www.secretservice.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/Protecting_Americas_Schools.pdf
- Alathari, L., Drysdale, D., Driscoll, S., Ed, M., Blair, A., Carlock, A., Cotkin, A., Johnston, B., Foley, C., Mauldin, D., McGarry, J., & Nemet, J. (n.d.). This report was authored by the staff of the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). 68.
- Silver, J., Simons, A., & Craun, S. (2018). A study of pre-attack behaviors of active shooters in the United States between 2000 and 2013 [File]. Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view
- Meloy, J. R., & Hoffmann, J. (2013). International handbook of threat assessment. Oxford University Press.
- Woitaszewski, S., Crepeau-Hobson, F., Conolly, C., & Cruz, M. (2018). Rules, requirements, and resources for school-based threat assessment: A fifty state analysis. Contemporary School Psychology, 22(2), 125–134. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-017-0161-y
- Wang, K, Kemp, J., & Burr, R. (2022). Crime, violence, discipline, and safety in U.S. public schools in 2019–20: Findings from the school survey on crime and safety (NCES 2022-029). U.S. Department of Education. https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2022/2022029.pdf
- Holland, K. M., Hall, J. E., Wang, J., Gaylor, E. M., Johnson, L. L., D. Shelby, Simon, T., & School-Associated Violent Deaths Study Group. (2019). Characteristics of school-associated youth homicides. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 68(3), 53–60.
- Cornell, D. G. (2015). Our schools are safe: Challenging the misperception that schools are dangerous places. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 85(3), 217–220. https://doi.org/10.1037/ort0000064
- Mann, A., Whitaker, A., Torres-Gullien, S., Morton, M., Jordan, H., Coyle, S., & Sun, W.-L. (2019). Cops & no counselors: How the lack of school mental health staff is harming students. Showcase of Faculty Scholarly & Creative Activity. https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/facultyshowcase/2019/showcase/11
- Langman, P., & Straub, F. (2019). A comparison of averted and completed school attacks from the Police Foundation Averted School Violence Database. Washington, DC. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.
- American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force. (2008). Are zero tolerance policies effective in the schools?: An evidentiary review and recommendations. American Psychologist, 63(9), 852–862. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.9.852
- Losen, D. J., & Martinez, P. (2020). Lost opportunities: How disparate school discipline continues to drive differences in the opportunity to learn. N.A.(n.a.). https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7hm2456z
- Fabelo, T., Thompson, M., Plotkin, M., Carmichael, D., Marchbanks III, M.P., & Booth, E. (2011). Breaking school rules: A statewide study of how school discipline relates to students’ success and juvenile justice involvement. Council of State Governments Justice Center.
- Morgan, E., Salomon, N., Plotkin, M., & Cohen, R. (2014). School discipline consensus report: Strategies from the field to keep students engaged in school and out of the juvenile justice system. https://www.ojp.gov/library/publications/school-discipline-consensus-report-strategies-field-keep-students-engaged
- Maeng, J. L., Cornell, D., & Huang, F. (2020). Student threat assessment as an alternative to exclusionary discipline. Journal of School Violence, 19(3), 377–388. https://doi.org/10.1080/15388220.2019.1707682
- Louvar Reeves, M. A., & Brock, S. E. (2018). School behavioral threat assessment and management. Contemporary School Psychology, 22(2), 148–162. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-017-0158-6
- Cornell, D. G., Sheras, P., Gregory, A., & Fan, X. (2009). A retrospective study of school safety conditions in high schools using the Virginia threat assessment guidelines versus alternative approaches. School Psychology Quarterly, 24(2), 119–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/15388220.2019.1707682
- Cornell, D. G., Gregory, A., & Fan, X. (2011). Reductions in long-term suspensions following adoption of the Virginia Student Threat Assessment Guidelines. NASSP Bulletin, 95(3), 175–194. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192636511415255
- Cornell, D. G., Sheras, P. L., Kaplan, S., McConville, D., Douglass, J., Elkon, A., & McKnight, L. (2004). Guidelines for student threat assessment: Field-test finding. School Psychology Review, 33(4), 527–554.
- Cornell, D., & JustChildren. (2013). Prevention v. Punishment: Threat assessment, school suspensions, and racial disparities. University of Virginia.
- Strong, K., & Cornell, D. (2008). Student threat assessment in Memphis city schools: A descriptive report. Behavioral Disorders, 34(1), 42–54. https://doi.org/10.1177/019874290803400104
- Allen, K., Cornell, D., Lorek, E., & Sheras, P. (2008). Response of school personnel to a student threat assessment training. School Effectiveness and School Improvement, 19(3), 319–332. https://doi.org/10.1080/09243450802332184
- Cornell, D. G. (2011). A developmental perspective on the Virginia student threat assessment guidelines. New Directions for Youth Development, 129, 43–59. https://doi.org/10.1002/yd.386
- Stohlman, S., Konold, T., & Cornell, D. (2020). Evaluation of threat assessment training for school personnel. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 7(1–2), 29–40. https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000142
- Civil Rights Data Collection. (n.d.). Retrieved July 27, 2021, from https://ocrdata.ed.gov/estimations/2017-2018
- Cornell, D. G., Maeng, J., Shukla, K., & Konold, T. (2018). Racial/ethnic parity in disciplinary consequences using student threat assessment. School Psychology Review, 47(2), 183–195. https://doi.org/10.17105/SPR-2017-0030.V47-2
- Cornell, D., & Lovegrove, P. (2015). Student threat assessment as a method for reducing student suspensions. In Race and Gender Disparities in School Discipline (pp. 180–191). Teachers College Press. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/18h2929c
- Maeng, J. L., Cornell, D. G., Kerere, J., Huang, F., Konold, T., & Afolabi, K. (2023). School threat assessment in Florida: Technical report of 2021-2022 case data.
- Miller, C., & Meyers, S. (2015). Disparities in school discipline practices for students with emotional and learning disabilities and autism. Journal of Education and Human Development, 4. https://doi.org/10.15640/jehd.v4n1a23
- Sullivan, A. L., Klingbeil, D. A., & Norman, E. R. V. (2013). Beyond behavior: Multilevel analysis of the influence of sociodemographics and school characteristics on students’ risk of suspension. School Psychology Review, 42(1), 99–114. https://doi.org/10.1080/02796015.2013.12087493
- Kaplan, S. G., & Cornell, D. G. (2005). Threats of violence by students in special education. Behavioral Disorders, 31(1), 107–119. https://doi.org/10.1177/019874290503100102
- Crepeau-Hobson, F., & Leech, N. (2021). Disciplinary and nondisciplinary outcomes of school-based threat assessment in Colorado schools. School Psychology Review 51(5), 609-618. https://doi.org/10.1080/2372966X.2020.1842716
- Amman, M., Bowlin, M., Buckles, L., Burton, K. C., Brunell, K. F., Gibson, K. A., Griffin, S. H., Kennedy, K., & Robins, C. J. (2017). Making prevention a reality: Identifying, assessing, and managing the threat of targeted attacks. U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view
- Calhoun, F. S., & Weston, S. W. (2021). All Threat, All Reporting Criteria.
- Cornell, D. (2018). Comprehensive school threat assessment guidelines. School Threat Assessment Consultants LLC.
- Colorado School Safety Resource Center, Department of Public Safety. (2020). Essentials of school threat assessment: Preventing targeted school violence. https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/CSSRC%20Documents/CSSRC_Essentials_of_TA_2020.pdf
- Kelly, S. R. (2018). The school psychologist’s role in leading multidisciplinary school-based threat assessment teams. Contemporary School Psychology, 22(2), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40688-017-0153-y
- U.S. Department of Education, Privacy Technical Assistance Center. (2019). School Resource Officers, School Law Enforcement Units, and the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED595430.pdf
- Cornell, D., & Maeng, J. (2020). National Center for School Safety Initial Survey of School Threat Assessment Experts. 15.
- Behavior Threat Assessment and Management (BTAM) Best Practice Considerations for K–12 Schools. (n.d.). National Association of School Psychologists (NASP). Retrieved January 31, 2022, from https://www.nasponline.org/resources-and-publications/resources-and-podcasts/school-safety-and-crisis/systems-level-prevention/threat-assessment-at-school/behavior-threat-assessment-and-management-(btam)-best-practice-considerations-for-k%E2%80%9312-schools
- Reeves, M., & McCarthy, C. (2021). Upholding student civil rights and preventing disproportionality in behavioral threat assessment and management (BTAM). National Association of School Psychologists. http://www.nasponline.org/btam-sped
- Averting targeted school violence: A U.S. secret service analysis of plots against schools | United States Secret Service. (n.d.). Retrieved January 31, 2022, from https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/reports/threat-assessments/schoolcampus-attacks/details-0
- Mulvey, E. P., & Cauffman, E. (2001). The inherent limits of predicting school violence. American Psychologist, 56(10), 797–802. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.10.797
- Fox, B., Heide, K., Khachatryan, N., Michel, C., & Cochran, J. (2021). Juveniles arrested for murder: A latent class analysis of male offenders. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 39(4), 470–491. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2531
- Cornell, D. G., Miller, C., & Benedek, E. P. (1988). MMPI profiles of adolescents charged with homicide. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 6, 401.
- Cornell, D. G. (1990). Prior adjustment of violent juvenile offenders. Law and Human Behavior, 14(6), 569–577. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01044882
- Toupin, J. (n.d.). Adolescent murderers: Validation of a typology and study of their recidivism in: A. V. Wilson (Ed.), Homicide: The victim/offender connection (pp. 135-156).
- Cornell, D. G., Benedek, E. P., & Benedek, D. M. (1987). Juvenile homicide: Prior adjustment and a proposed typology. The American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 57(3), 383–393. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-0025.1987.tb03547.x
- Langman, P. (2009). Rampage school shooters: A typology. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 14(1), 79–86. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2008.10.003
- Kazdin, A. E. (2015). Psychosocial treatments for conduct disorder in children and adolescents. In a guide to treatments that work, 4th ed (pp. 141–173). Oxford University Press.
- Van der Kolk, B. A. (2014). The body keeps the score: Brain, mind, and body in the healing of trauma. Viking.
- Wamser-Nanney, R., Nanney, J. T., Conrad, E., & Constans, J. I. (2019). Childhood trauma exposure and gun violence risk factors among victims of gun violence. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice and Policy, 11(1), 99–106. https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0000410
- Overstreet, S., & Chafouleas, S. M. (2016). Trauma-informed schools: Introduction to the special issue. School Mental Health, 8(1), 1–6. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12310-016-9184-1
- Calhoun, F. S., & Weston, S. W. (2003). Contemporary threat management: A practical guide for identifying, assessing, and managing individuals of violent intent. Specialized Training Services.
- Langman, P. (2021). Warning Signs: Identifying School Shooters Before They Strike | School Shooters .info. https://schoolshooters.info/warning-signs-book
- Woodward, W., & Goodrum, S. (n.d.). Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting. 141.
- Meloy, J. R. (2021). International Handbook of Threat Assessment (J. Hoffmann, Ed.; 2nd edition). Oxford University Press.
- Pollack, W. S., Modzeleski, W., & Rooney, G. (2008). Prior knowledge of potential school-based violence: Information students learn may prevent a targeted attack. In U.S. Department of Education (p. 15). U.S. Secret Service and US Department of Education. https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED511645
- Planty, M., Banks, D. C., Lindquist, C. H., Cartwright, J. K., & Witwer, A. R. (2020). Tip lines for school safety: A national portrait of tip line use. https://www.rti.org/publication/tip-lines-school-safety
- Stohlman, S. L., & Cornell, D. G. (2019). An online educational program to increase student understanding of threat assessment. The Journal of School Health, 89(11), 899–906. https://doi.org/10.1111/josh.12827
- Madfis, E. (2020). How to stop school rampage killing: Lessons from averted mass shootings and bombings. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-37181-4
- Stallings, R., & Hall, J. C. (2019). Averted targeted school killings from 1900-2016. Criminal Justice Studies, 32(3), 222–238. https://doi.org/10.1080/1478601X.2019.1618296
- Singh, J. P., Grann, M., & Fazel, S. (2011). A comparative study of violence risk assessment tools: A systematic review and metaregression analysis of 68 studies involving 25,980 participants. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(3), 499–513. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2010.11.009
- Meloy, J. R., & O’Toole, M. E. (2011). The Concept of Leakage in Threat Assessment: The concept of leakage in threat assessment. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 29(4), 513–527. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.986
- Millspaugh, S., Cornell, D., Huang, F., & Datta, P. (2015). Prevalence of aggressive attitudes and willingness to report threats in middle school. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2, 11–22. https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000031
- Perkins, J. M., Perkins, H. W., & Craig, D. W. (2020). Norms and attitudes about being an active bystander: Support for telling adults about seeing knives or guns at school among greater London youth. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 49(4), 849–868. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-019-01127-7
- Crichlow-Ball, C., & Cornell, D. (2019, August). Does School Climate Facilitate Student Threat Reporting? [Poster]. 2019 American Psychological Association National Convention, Chicago, IL. https://education.virginia.edu/sites/default/files/images/YVP/Crichlow-Ball%20APA%202019%20Does%20School%20Climate%20Facilitate%20Student%20Threat%20Reporting.pdf
- Cameron, K. (2018). VTRA – North American Center for Threat Assessment and Trauma Response. Violence Threat Risk Assessment (VTRA). https://www.nactatr.com/vtra.html
- Leuschner, V., Schroer-Hippel, M., Bondü, R., & Scheithauer, H. (2012). Indicated prevention of severe targeted school violence: NETWorks Against School Shootings (NETWASS). In School Shootings (pp. 401–420). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5526-4_18
- Van Dreal, J. (Ed.). (2016). Assessing student threats: Implementing the salem-keizer system, 2nd Edition. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781475830507/Assessing-Student-Threats-Implementing-the-Salem-Keizer-System-2nd-Edition
- Oksanen, A., Kaltiala-Heino, R., Holkeri, E., & Lindberg, N. (2015). School shooting threats as a national phenomenon: Comparison of police reports and psychiatric reports in Finland. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 16(2), 145–159.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14043858.2015.1101823 - Wisconsin Department of Justice Office of School Safety. (2019). Wisconsin school threat assessment protocol: A guide for school personnel and law enforcement officers. Wisconsin Department of Justice. https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/school-safety/WI_School_Threat_Assessment_Protocol.pdf
- South. (2020). School-based behavioral threat assessment & management: Best practices guide for South Carolina K-12 schools. State of South Carolina Department of Education.
- Deisinger, G. (2020). Threat assessment and management in Virginia public schools: Model policies, procedures, and guidelines. Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services: Virginia Center for School and Campus. https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/sites/dcjs.virginia.gov/files/publications/law-enforcement/threat-assessment-model-policies-procedures-and-guidelinespdf_0.pdf
- Hall, C. M., Bertuccio, R. F., Mazer, T. M., & Tawiah, C. O. (2020). Google kt: A component analysis of free online violent threat assessment tools for schools. The Rural Educator, 41(1), 21. https://doi.org/10.35608/ruraled.v41i1.680
- Cornell, D. G., Allen, K., & Fan, X. (2012). A randomized controlled study of the Virginia Student Threat Assessment Guidelines in kindergarten through grade 12. School Psychology Review, 41(1), 100–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/02796015.2012.12087378
- Nekvasil, E. K., & Cornell, D. G. (2015). Student threat assessment associated with safety in middle schools. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2(2), 98–113. https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000038
- Cornell, D. G., Maeng, J. L., Burnette, A. G., Jia, Y., Huang, F., Konold, T., Datta, P., Malone, M., & Meyer, P. (2017). Student threat assessment as a standard school safety practice: Results from a statewide implementation study. School Psychology Quarterly, 33(2), 213–222. https://doi.org/10.1037/spq0000220
- Leuschner, V., Fiedler, N., Schultze, M., Ahlig, N., Göbel, K., Sommer, F., Scholl, J., Cornell, D., & Scheithauer, H. (2017). Prevention of targeted school violence by responding to students’ psychosocial crises: The NETWASS program. Child Development, 88(1), 68–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12690
- Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). (n.d.). Justia Law. Retrieved October 6, 2021, from https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/565/
- Alexander, K., & Alexander, M. D. (2018). Alexander and Alexander’s the law of schools, students and teachers in a nutshell, 6th. West Academic Publishing. https://www.westacademic.com/Alexander-and-Alexanders-The-Law-of-Schools-Students-and-Teachers-in-a-Nutshell-6th-9781640204249
- Protecting Student Privacy. (n.d.). Does FERPA permit the sharing of education records with outside law enforcement officials, mental health officials, and other experts in the community who serve on a school’s threat assessment team? Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/does-ferpa-permit-sharing-education-records-outside-law-enforcement-officials-mental-health
- Rights (OCR), O. for C. (2008, May 7). Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule [Text]. HHS.Gov. https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html
- Alder, S. (2022, January 9). Does HIPAA apply to schools? HIPAA Journal. https://www.hipaajournal.com/does-hipaa-apply-to-schools/
- Johnson, R., Persad, G., & Sisti, D. (2014). The Tarasoff rule: The implications of interstate variation and gaps in professional training. The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 42(4), 469–477.
- Johnson, R., Persad, G., & Sisti, D. (2019). The Tarasoff rule: The implications of interstate variation and Gaps in Professional Training. FOCUS, 17(4), 435–442. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.focus.17402
- Protecting Student Privacy. (n.d.). FERPA. Retrieved August 19, 2022, from https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/ferpa
- 20-255 Mahanoy Area School Dist. V. B. L. (06/23/2021). (2021). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-255_g3bi.pdf
- Borum, R., Cornell, D. G., Modzeleski, W., & Jimerson, S. R. (2010). What can be done about school shootings?: A review of the evidence. Educational Researcher, 39(1), 27–37. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X09357620
- Cornell, D. G., Mayer, M. J., & Sulkowski, M. L. (2021). History and future of school safety research. School Psychology Review, 50(2–3), 143–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/2372966X.2020.1857212
- Carroll, C., Patterson, M., Wood, S., Booth, A., Rick, J., & Balain, S. (2007). A conceptual framework for implementation fidelity. Implementation Science, 2(1), 40. https://doi.org/10.1186/1748-5908-2-40
- National Implementation Research Network. (n.d.). Module 4: Implementation Stages. Frank Porter Graham Child Development Institute. https://nirn.fpg.unc.edu/ module-1/implementation-stages
- Cornell, D. G., & Maeng, J. L. (2021). School threat assessment experts training and practice standards survey. Charlottesville, VA: School of Education and Human Development.
- Reeves, M., Kanan, L. M., & Plog, A. E. (2010). Comprehensive Planning for Safe Learning Environments: A School Professional’s Guide to Integrating Physical and Psychological Safety – Prevention through Recovery. Routledge. https://www.routledge.com/Comprehensive-Planning-for-Safe-Learning-Environments-A-School-Professionals/Reeves-Kanan-Plog/p/book/9780415998352
- Crosse, S., Williams, B., Hagen, C. A., Harmon, M., Ristow, L., DiGaetano, R., Broene, P., Alexander, D., & Tseng, M. (2011). Prevalence and Implementation Fidelity of Research-Based Prevention Programs in Public Schools: Final Report.
- Fixsen, D., Naoom, S., Blase, K., Friedman, R., & Wallace, F. (2005). Implementation Research: A Synthesis of the Literature. The National Implementation Research Network. https://nirn.fpg.unc.edu/resources/implementation-research-synthesis-literature
- Durlak, J. A., & DuPre, E. P. (2008). Implementation matters: A review of research on the influence of implementation on program outcomes and the factors affecting implementation. American Journal of Community Psychology, 41(3–4), 327–350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10464-008-9165-0
- Gottfredson, D. C., & Gottfredson, G. D. (2002). Quality of school-based prevention programs: Results from a national survey. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 39(1), 3–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/002242780203900101
- Payne, A. A., Gottfredson, D. C., & Gottfredson, G. D. (2006). School predictors of the intensity of implementation of school-based prevention programs: Results from a national study. Prevention Science: The Official Journal of the Society for Prevention Research, 7(2), 225–237. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11121-006-0029-2
- National Implementation Research Network. (n.d.). Module 2: Implementation Drivers. Retrieved September 9, 2022, from https://implementation.fpg.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/Implementation-Drivers-Overview.pdf
- CHDS School Shooting Safety Compendium. (n.d.). CHDS School Shooting Safety Compendium. Retrieved September 14, 2022, from https://www.chds.us/ssdb/
- Reporting on guns and gun violence in America. (n.d.). The Trace. Retrieved November 19, 2021, from https://www.thetrace.org/
- Graham, S., Bellmore, A. D., & Mize, J. (2006). Peer victimization, aggression, and their co-occurrence in middle school: Pathways to adjustment problems. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 34(3), 363–378. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10802-006-9030-2
- Juvonen, J., Nishina, A., & Graham, S. (2000). Peer harassment, psychological adjustment, and school functioning in early adolescence. Journal of Educational Psychology, 92(2), 349–359. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-0663.92.2.349
- Cornell, D. G., Gregory, A., Huang, F., & Fan, X. (2008). Virginia High School Safety Study. University of Virginia, Youth Violence Project, 132.
- Yang, C., Manchanda, S., Lin, X., & Teng, Z. (2021). An intersectional examination of the effects of race/ethnicity and immigrant status on school victimization in predominantly hispanic/latinx high schools. School Psychology Review, 50(2–3), 303–315. https://doi.org/10.1080/2372966X.2020.1840262
- Ingersoll, R. M. (2002). The teacher shortage: A case of wrong diagnosis and wrong prescription. NASSP Bulletin, 86(631), 16–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/019263650208663103
- Ronfeldt, M., Loeb, S., & Wyckoff, J. (2013). How teacher turnover harms student achievement. American Educational Research Journal, 50(1), 4–36. https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831212463813
- Sutcher, L., Darling-Hammond, L., & Carver-Thomas, D. (n.d.). A Coming Crisis in Teaching? 107.
- Gage, N. A., Larson, A., Sugai, G., & Chafouleas, S. M. (2016). Student Perceptions of School Climate as Predictors of Office Discipline Referrals. American Educational Research Journal, 53(3), 492–515. https://doi.org/10.3102/0002831216637349
- Loukas, A., & Robinson, S. (2004). Examining the Moderating Role of Perceived School Climate in Early Adolescent Adjustment. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 14(2), 209–233. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2004.01402004.x
- Thapa, A., Cohen, J., Guffey, S., & Higgins-D’Alessandro, A. (2013). A Review of School Climate Research. Review of Educational Research, 83(3), 357–385. https://doi.org/10.3102/0034654313483907
- Wang, M.-T., & Degol, J. L. (2016). School Climate: A Review of the Construct, Measurement, and Impact on Student Outcomes. Educational Psychology Review, 28(2), 315–352. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10648-015-9319-1
- Cornell, D. G., Huang, F. L.,Konold, T. R., Shukla, K., Malone, M., Datta, P., Jia, Y., Stohlman, S., Burnette, A. G., & Meyer III, J. P. (2017). Development of a Standard Model for School Climate and Safety Assessment. (n.d.). Final Report, 147.
- Noltemeyer, A. L., Ward, R. M., & Mcloughlin, C. (2015). Relationship Between School Suspension and Student Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis. School Psychology Review, 44(2), 224–240. https://doi.org/10.17105/spr-14-0008.1
- Lee, T., Cornell, D., Gregory, A., & Fan, X. (2011). High Suspension Schools and Dropout Rates for Black and White Students. Education and Treatment of Children, 34(2), 167–192. https://doi.org/10.1353/etc.2011.0014
- Gregory, A., Skiba, R. J., & Noguera, P. A. (2010). The achievement gap and the discipline gap: Two sides of the same coin? Educational Researcher, 39(1), 59–68. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X09357621
- Burnette, A. G., Datta, P., & Cornell, D. (2018). The distinction between transient and substantive student threats. Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 5(1), 4–20. https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000092